+ reject("%s: deb contents timestamp check failed [%s: %s]" % (filename, sys.exc_type, sys.exc_value))
+
+################################################################################
+
+def lookup_uid_from_fingerprint(fpr):
+ q = Upload.projectB.query("SELECT u.uid, u.name FROM fingerprint f, uid u WHERE f.uid = u.id AND f.fingerprint = '%s'" % (fpr))
+ qs = q.getresult()
+ if len(qs) == 0:
+ return (None, None)
+ else:
+ return qs[0]
+
+def check_signed_by_key():
+ """Ensure the .changes is signed by an authorized uploader."""
+
+ (uid, uid_name) = lookup_uid_from_fingerprint(changes["fingerprint"])
+ if uid_name == None:
+ uid_name = ""
+
+ # match claimed name with actual name:
+ if uid == None:
+ uid, uid_email = changes["fingerprint"], uid
+ may_nmu, may_sponsor = 1, 1
+ # XXX by default new dds don't have a fingerprint/uid in the db atm,
+ # and can't get one in there if we don't allow nmu/sponsorship
+ elif uid[:3] == "dm:":
+ uid_email = uid[3:]
+ may_nmu, may_sponsor = 0, 0
+ else:
+ uid_email = "%s@debian.org" % (uid)
+ may_nmu, may_sponsor = 1, 1
+
+ if uid_email in [changes["maintaineremail"], changes["changedbyemail"]]:
+ sponsored = 0
+ elif uid_name in [changes["maintainername"], changes["changedbyname"]]:
+ sponsored = 0
+ if uid_name == "": sponsored = 1
+ else:
+ sponsored = 1
+ if ("source" in changes["architecture"] and
+ daklib.utils.is_email_alias(uid_email)):
+ sponsor_addresses = daklib.utils.gpg_get_key_addresses(changes["fingerprint"])
+ if (changes["maintaineremail"] not in sponsor_addresses and
+ changes["changedbyemail"] not in sponsor_addresses):
+ changes["sponsoremail"] = uid_email
+
+ if sponsored and not may_sponsor:
+ reject("%s is not authorised to sponsor uploads" % (uid))
+
+ if not sponsored and not may_nmu:
+ source_ids = []
+ check_suites = changes["distribution"].keys()
+ if "unstable" not in check_suites: check_suites.append("unstable")
+ for suite in check_suites:
+ suite_id = database.get_suite_id(suite)
+ q = Upload.projectB.query("SELECT s.id FROM source s JOIN src_associations sa ON (s.id = sa.source) WHERE s.source = '%s' AND sa.suite = %d" % (changes["source"], suite_id))
+ for si in q.getresult():
+ if si[0] not in source_ids: source_ids.append(si[0])
+
+ print "source_ids: %s" % (",".join([str(x) for x in source_ids]))
+
+ is_nmu = 1
+ for si in source_ids:
+ is_nmu = 1
+ q = Upload.projectB.query("SELECT m.name FROM maintainer m WHERE m.id IN (SELECT maintainer FROM src_uploaders WHERE src_uploaders.source = %s)" % (si))
+ for m in q.getresult():
+ (rfc822, rfc2047, name, email) = daklib.utils.fix_maintainer(m[0])
+ if email == uid_email or name == uid_name:
+ is_nmu=0
+ break
+ if is_nmu:
+ reject("%s may not upload/NMU source package %s" % (uid, changes["source"]))
+
+ for b in changes["binary"].keys():
+ for suite in changes["distribution"].keys():
+ suite_id = database.get_suite_id(suite)
+ q = Upload.projectB.query("SELECT DISTINCT s.source FROM source s JOIN binaries b ON (s.id = b.source) JOIN bin_associations ba On (b.id = ba.bin) WHERE b.package = '%s' AND ba.suite = %s" % (b, suite_id))
+ for s in q.getresult():
+ if s[0] != changes["source"]:
+ reject("%s may not hijack %s from source package %s in suite %s" % (uid, b, s, suite))
+
+ for f in files.keys():
+ if files[f].has_key("byhand"):
+ reject("%s may not upload BYHAND file %s" % (uid, f))
+ if files[f].has_key("new"):
+ reject("%s may not upload NEW file %s" % (uid, f))
+
+ # The remaining checks only apply to binary-only uploads right now
+ if changes["architecture"].has_key("source"):
+ return
+
+ if not Cnf.Exists("Binary-Upload-Restrictions"):
+ return
+
+ restrictions = Cnf.SubTree("Binary-Upload-Restrictions")
+
+ # If the restrictions only apply to certain components make sure
+ # that the upload is actual targeted there.
+ if restrictions.Exists("Components"):
+ restricted_components = restrictions.SubTree("Components").ValueList()
+ is_restricted = False
+ for f in files:
+ if files[f]["component"] in restricted_components:
+ is_restricted = True
+ break
+ if not is_restricted:
+ return
+
+ # Assuming binary only upload restrictions are in place we then
+ # iterate over suite and architecture checking the key is in the
+ # allowed list. If no allowed list exists for a given suite or
+ # architecture it's assumed to be open to anyone.
+ for suite in changes["distribution"].keys():
+ if not restrictions.Exists(suite):
+ continue
+ for arch in changes["architecture"].keys():
+ if not restrictions.SubTree(suite).Exists(arch):
+ continue
+ allowed_keys = restrictions.SubTree("%s::%s" % (suite, arch)).ValueList()
+ if changes["fingerprint"] not in allowed_keys:
+ base_filename = os.path.basename(pkg.changes_file)
+ reject("%s: not signed by authorised uploader for %s/%s"
+ % (base_filename, suite, arch))