-.\".TP
-.\".B -m
-.\"Ordinarily,
-.\".B rpc.gssd
-.\"looks for a cached ticket for user $UID in /tmp/krb5cc_$UID.
-.\"With the -m option, the user with uid 0 will be treated specially, and will
-.\"be mapped instead to the credentials for the principal nfs/hostname found in
-.\"the keytab file.
-.\"(This option is now the default and is ignored if specified.)
+.IP
+Previous versions of
+.B rpc.gssd
+used only "nfs/*" keys found within the keytab.
+To be more consistent with other implementations, we now look for
+specific keytab entries. The search order for keytabs to be used
+for "machine credentials" is now:
+.br
+ <HOSTNAME>$@<REALM>
+.br
+ root/<hostname>@<REALM>
+.br
+ nfs/<hostname>@<REALM>
+.br
+ host/<hostname>@<REALM>
+.br
+ root/<anyname>@<REALM>
+.br
+ nfs/<anyname>@<REALM>
+.br
+ host/<anyname>@<REALM>
+.IP
+If this search order does not use the correct key then provide a
+keytab file that contains only correct keys.
+.TP
+.B -l
+Tells
+.B rpc.gssd
+to limit session keys to Single DES even if the kernel supports stronger
+encryption types. Service ticket encryption is still governed by what
+the KDC believes the target server supports. This way the client can
+access a server that has strong keys in its keytab for ticket decryption
+but whose kernel only supports Single DES.
+.IP
+The alternative is to put only Single DES keys in the server's keytab
+and limit encryption types for its principal to Single DES on the KDC
+which will cause service tickets for this server to be encrypted using
+only Single DES and (as a side-effect) contain only Single DES session
+keys.
+.IP
+This legacy behaviour is only required for older servers
+(pre nfs-utils-1.2.4). If the server has a recent kernel, Kerberos
+implementation and nfs-utils it will work just fine with stronger
+encryption.
+.IP
+.B Note:
+This option is only available with Kerberos libraries that
+support setable encryption types.